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Abstract: Several recent works have proposed and implemented cryptography 
as a means to preserve privacy and security of patient’s health data. 
Nevertheless, the weakest point of electronic health record (EHR) systems  
that relied on these cryptographic schemes is key management. Thus,  
this paper presents the development of privacy and security system  
for cryptography-based-EHR by taking advantage of the uniqueness of 
fingerprint and iris characteristic features to secure cryptographic keys in a  
bio-cryptography framework. The results of the system evaluation showed 
significant improvements in terms of time efficiency of this approach to 
cryptographic-based-EHR. Both the fuzzy vault and fuzzy commitment 
demonstrated false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0%, which reduces the likelihood  
of imposters gaining successful access to the keys protecting patients’ protected 
health information. This result also justifies the feasibility of implementing 
fuzzy key binding scheme in real applications, especially fuzzy vault which 
demonstrated a better performance during key reconstruction. 
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1 Introduction 
Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society defines electronic health 
record (EHR) as “a secure, real-time, point-of-care, patient centric information resource 
for clinicians” (HIMSS, 2003). EHR is on the verge of receiving widespread adoption as 
an instrument for improving the understanding of the state of health of individuals as it 
contains useful, legal and computerised historical health data from a variety of sources. 
Over time, a patient’s EHR accumulates significant information, such as identifying 
information, hospital visitations, laboratory data, surgery, radiology reports, allergies, 
vital signs, immunisations, prescriptions, sexual preference, psychological profiles, 
physician progress notes and among other relevant data that defines a medical record 
(Mercuri, 2004; Tiwari and Kumar, 2015). The importance of these data to healthcare 
providers, patients and cybercriminals made it necessary that the EHR designs be 
responsible for securing patients’ personal data, health records and managing the access 
rights to them (IMIA, 2000; Brumen et al., 2013; CTI, 2016). 
In several studies, patients’ participation has been identified as crucial to manage 
records, because patients’ growing concern over the privacy and security of their personal 
and sensitive data stored in EHR has been a contributing factor to the slow adoption of 
this technology (Escarfullet et al., 2012; Dinev et al., 2016). Based on a survey report, 
73% of information privacy and security issues reported by health organisation over the 
years involved electronic data (Hewapathiranae, 2011). Studies have shown that millions 
of patient records have been breached and are at the risk in the hands of malicious users 
(Robertson, 2014; Harris, 2016). In the USA alone, since 2005, more than 300 data 
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breaches in which 100,000 or more records were compromised have been publicly 
disclosed in the health industry (Collins and Robertson, 2014). Also, since 2009, the 
annual number of cyber-attacks against the healthcare sector has drastically increased; 
often the number of attacks exceeds the previous year’s count by at least 40% (ICIT, 
2016). Similarly, more often than expected, the majority of threats that healthcare 
organisations face are internal among other sources of threats (Gordon et al., 2006; 
Computer Economics, 2007; Srinivasan, 2016; Sanzgiri and Dasgupta, 2016). With inside 
attacks either continuously outnumbering or being the leading cause of external threats, 
most research still paid more attention to outsiders. The cost of privacy and 
confidentiality breaches is very difficult to recover for both the healthcare provider and 
patient (Appari and Johnson, 2010). 
For privacy reasons, patients at some point may be unwilling to disclose important 
information about some health problems such as psychiatric behaviour and HIV as their 
violation or disclosure may lead to social stigma, unfair treatment by employers  
and possibly irreversible damage to their professional reputation (Omotosho and 
Emuoyibofarhe, 2014; Carroll, 2016). Privacy and security are crucial factors in 
electronic healthcare; cryptography is the science of information scrambling and it has 
been recommended to be used everywhere for ensuring privacy and security (Demiris, 
2004; Escarfullet et al., 2012; Hewitt, 2013; Bhartiya and Mehrotra, 2015; Grunwel and 
Sahama, 2016). Through cryptography, a number of autonomous patients controlled 
health record systems have been proposed and were discussed in Omotosho and 
Emuoyibofarhe (2014). Cryptographic-based-EHR has become very popular but patients’ 
privacy could still be violated, if in a patient controlled system, encryption keys are not 
efficiently managed. Likewise, clinician work flow would be hampered, if in the course 
of ensuring privacy, health data are not available in decrypted form for authorised access. 
EHR promises monolithic benefits if the mechanisms tailored towards achieving 
privacy and security are not too cumbersome and can easily be managed by both the 
patient and physician without affecting the timeliness, clinician workflow and quality of 
healthcare service delivery (Hillestad et al., 2005; Omotosho and Emuoyibofarhe, 2014). 
The focus of this study is to address privacy and security issues by taking advantage of 
the fuzziness of biometrics data to protect cryptographic keys in the developed EHR 
application using the concept of bio-cryptography. Bio-cryptography blends biometrics 
with cryptography by combining the benefits of both technologies to provide a stronger 
means to protect against system attacks. These techniques protect a secret key using 
biometric feature or generate a key from biometric features. There are two popular 
approaches to implement bio-cryptography: the key binding approach – which is the 
binding of cryptographic keys along with biometric template and the key generating 
approach – which involves generating cryptographic keys from biometric templates 
(Stavroulakis and Stamp, 2010; Scheirer et al., 2010; Das, 2012). Bio-cryptography key 
binding method will be used to control access to patient’s key by physicians. 
Popular bio-cryptography key binding methods are the fuzzy vault and fuzzy 
commitment. The archetype for fuzzy vault construct was proposed by Juels and Sudan 
(2002). Fuzzy vault is an error tolerant encryption that is suited for applications 
combining both biometrics and cryptography. Fuzzy commitment technique was 
proposed by Juels and Wattenberg (1999). They combined the error-correcting codes and 
cryptography to fuzzy commitment scheme (Rathgeb and Uhl, 2011). The purpose of 
fuzzy commitment scheme is to bind biometric features of a user with a key prepared 
with an error correction code to overcome the fuzziness of biometric measurements. It is 
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very similar to fuzzy vault except that it is not an error tolerant encryption operation 
because it does not support order invariance. Several variants of fingerprint fuzzy vault 
and iris fuzzy commitment have been widely modified and experimented with as 
presented in our previous work in Omotosho and Emuoyibofarhe (2014). Even though, 
this work centres on fuzzy vault because it is more suitable for applications using 
biometrics and cryptography, both techniques were used in this study since neither of the 
bio-cryptography approach have been applied in real applications like the EHR where 
timeliness is of high value. This strategy together with the designed joint EHR 
management architecture has the capability of improving patients’ privacy and security in 
a cryptographic-based-EHR. 
2 Methodology and system description 
The development of the privacy enhanced bio-cryptography key management system 
involves the steps highlighted in Table 1. 
Table 1 Summary of research activities 
Steps Research activities 
1 The formulation of a cryptographic key generation scheme where unique and 
reproducible keys were derived from image statistics features of grey level  
cooccurrence matrix 
2 The modification of a fuzzy vault bio-cryptographic key protection technique  
for protecting the keys produced 
3 The derivation of a shared EHR privacy rule scheme through EHR questionnaires.  
This ensured that a successful access does not imply privilege to a complete EHR of 
patient. A requester of a patient EHR cannot view the EHR parts with patients’ privacy 
set 
4 The implementation of an EHR accountability scheme that ensured that insiders’ 
infringements on EHR are traceable. The implementation and evaluation of the EHR 
system were carried out using tools, such as Microsoft Office Visio, Microsoft Visual C#, 
Java and Matlab 
2.1 Cryptographic key generation method using grey level cooccurrence matrix 
(GLCM) technique 
Unique encryption keys were generated from second order statistical features of image 
using GLCM and this is similar to the cryptographic key generation method proposed in 
Omotosho and Emuoyibofarhe (2015). This approach makes it possible to reproduce the 
same key repeatedly from the same image and patients do not have to store or memorise 
keys. Unlike image steganography where data is hidden in an image, keys were generated 
and not hidden in the image and this makes it difficult to steal patient’s key. The 
algorithm was modified to take time attributes which defines the usage limit period of 
each key generated as shown in Section 2.1.1. The time attributes were presented in the 
form of days, hours, minutes and seconds. This is to ensure that the definition of privacy 
is fulfilled at key generation level. That is, the right of a patient to determine when and 
how their records are accessed. This way, a patient reduces the risk of having encrypted 
part of EHR available to a physician once consultation is completed. 
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2.1.1 Algorithm for key generation (adapted from Omotosho and 
Emuoyibofarhe (2015)) 
1 Start 
2 Reading the image into array 
3 Convert the image into a matrix [20, n]. where n is number of column in the image 
matrix 
4 Specify the distance between neighbouring pixels, r 
5 Specify the angle, D of the grey level cooccurrence matrix 
i If D = 90° then set offset = r*[–1 0] 
ii If D = 45° then set offset = r*[–1 1] 
iii If D = 135° then set offset = r*[–1 –1] 
iv If D = 0° then set offset = r*[0 1] 
6 Find the trace of the matrix (sum of the diagonal of the matrix) 
7 Compute other image descriptor values (Contrast, Correlation, Energy, Entropy, 
Homogeneity) 
8 Set k = Trace * Contrast * Correlation * Energy * Entropy * Homogeneity 
9 Set count = location of decimal point and set GLCMKey = 1.0 
10 GLCMKey* = Math.Pow (10, count) 
11 Show time option, Hour, Minutes and Seconds 
12 Set active time and expiry time 
13 Stop 
2.2 Bio-cryptography key binding approach 
The keys generated were stored in user’s biometric templates using two different 
biometrics. The fingerprint minutiae and iris codes extracted from captured users 
templates were used in the fuzzy vault and fuzzy commitment key constructs, 
respectively. The rationales for the biometrics choice are described as follows. 
2.2.1 Fingerprint 
The fingerprint minutiae served as the biometric templates, which were stored in the 
database in the form of fuzzy vault helper data. The fundamental reasons for the choice  
of this biometrics in this research are: 
i enrolment takes little time 
ii large number of people are conversant with identification based on the use  
of fingerprint 
iii works well with fuzzy vault. 
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2.2.2 Iris 
Iris codes are the biometric templates which are stored in the database. This biometrics is 
selected for the following reasons: 
i iris is well protected against wear and damage because it is an internal organ 
ii iris texture is stable over a long time; it is one of the most accurate and consistent 
biometric 
iii it has one of the lowest FRR 
iv works well with fuzzy commitment. 
2.2.3 Fuzzy vault algorithm 
Fuzzy vault relies on polynomial construction and the stronger the polynomial, the more 
security of the system. The complexity in decoding the vault polynomial construction 
could result in trading strong security for higher running time and high FRR. The 
modified algorithm generated a polynomial of degree n and not n – 1 for a key of length. 
This was done to make the polynomial stronger and also rather than projecting the keys 
as coefficients of the polynomial, new sets of coefficients were generated. 
2.2.3.1 Encryption algorithm 
i A cryptographic key generated from GLCM is represented as ABCD where A, B, C 
and D are integer numbers. 
ii Using A, B, C and D as the polynomial root and introducing variable x as the 
unknown, a polynomial can be derived thus: 
    (x – A)(x – B)(x – C)(x – D) 
    x4 – (A + B + C + D)x3 + (AB + AC + AD + BC + BD + CD)x3  
    – (ABC + ABD + ACD + BCD)x + ABCD. 
iii Extracting the coefficient of the resulting polynomial 
    1, –(A + B + C + D), (AB + AC + AD + BC + BD + CD),  
    –(ABC + ABD + ACD + BCD), and ABCD. 
iv Converting coefficients (ci) to base64 
    1 = c1; –(A + B + C + D)64 = c2; (AB + AC + AD + BC + BD + CD)64 = c3; 
    – (ABC + ABD + ACD + BCD)64 = c4 
v Given a biometric data B = {b0b1b2b3b4 b5b6b7b8b9 …, bn} extracted from a 
template. 
vi Convert B into the same base as the coefficients c1, c2, c3, c4, and c5. 
Given that 0 ≤ z ≤ n where z in a position within length B(n) 
Fuzzy vault data = {b0b1b2b3 … bn–zc1bn–zc2 … bn–zc3 … bn–zc4 … bn}. 
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2.2.3.2 Decryption algorithm 
i If biometrics verification was successful, then {c1, c2, c3, c4, and c5} will be 
extracted. 
ii Convert {c1, c2, c3, c4, and c5} to decimal {d1, d2, d3, d4, and d5}. 
iii Reconstruct polynomial with coefficients {d1, d2, d3, d4, and d5} and symbolic 
variable x: 
    4 3 2 1 01 2 3 4 5 .d x d x d x d x d x+ + + +  
iv Solving the polynomial 4 3 21 2 3 4 5 0d x d x d x d x d+ + + =+  
    ( )( )( )( ).x A x B x C x D− − − −  
2.2.4 Fuzzy commitment algorithm 
Similar to Hao et al. (2006), Hadamard codes were used with the iris code to correct bit 
errors resulting from natural biometric variance while burst errors arising from distortions 
were corrected using Reed-Solomon codes. The algorithm for fuzzy commitment 
encryption and decryption are presented in Sections 2.2.4.1 and 2.2.4.2. 
2.2.4.1 Encoding algorithm 
i Given a biometric data B1 = {b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9 … bn} where b are binary 
representation of iris code. 
ii Apply Reed Solomon and Hadamard ECC on the original biometrics B1 to 
generate a codeword. 
iii Let commitment B2 = {b0b1b2b3b4b5b6b7b8b9 … bn} + key + codeword. 
iv Set hamming distance threshold = 0.30. This is to balance the system’s false 
acceptance rate (FAR) and FRR because matching has to be done using error 
correction schemes and this prevents the use of complex biometric template 
matchers developed uniquely for matching the original template. 
v Discard B1 and store commitment B2 in the database as the fuzzy commitment. 
2.2.4.2 Decoding algorithm 
i Given a query template A = {a0a1a2a3a4a5a6a7a8a9 … an} 
ii At authentication A is compared B2. 
iii Key is unlocked if the difference of the hamming distance is less than threshold, 
which implies that A is sufficiently close to the original template. 
2.3 EHR privacy scheme 
A total of 250 questionnaires were administered in 17 different hospitals in Lagos State 
and Ogun State to identify some attributes of patients EHR which were used to formulate 
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the record partitions. Random sampling technique was used with the questionnaires to 
generate patient’s parameters. The questionnaire was standardised using five level 
Linkert scale and in order for data to be representable in the EHR, the results were further 
trimmed down to two scales. The EHR questionnaire acquired data for basic, confidential 
and emergency sections of patient’s health record, with respect to record sharing. 
Consequently, in the scope of this work: 
i basic attributes implies information about patients which should be available at all 
times to physicians, hospitals and other entities such as employers, organisations 
and research institutes without acquiring patient’s permission 
ii confidential attributes are information of patient health record that should not 
always be available or shared with other healthcare providers, employers, 
organisations or research institutes without patient’s full consent 
iii emergency attributes are attributes that should be sufficient to take care of patients 
in pre-hospital care or emergency situations. 
The result of the privacy scheme was partitioned EHR based on the categories. The 
presented privacy architecture disabled the locking of certain fields (basic) of EHR 
determined by some privacy policies to prevent hampering the clinician workflow and 
practice. This is because allowing patients to lock all their records could be burdensome, 
time consuming and impractical. From Figure 1, in order to achieve privacy, the system 
provides a joint EHR – patient privacy rule. EHR privacy rule is enforced by the provider 
while a patient as depicted in the architecture can use a symbol such as ‘H’ to have 
exclusive right to an attributes (confidential) of his or her record. This feature was 
implemented in the form of patient key generated from the method presented earlier. The 
components of this architecture are described in the following sub sections. 
Figure 1 EHR rule and accountability architecture (see online version for colours) 
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2.3.1 Monitoring phase 
The monitoring phase involves the process of tracking the access time of records, digital 
signature of practitioner that access records, operations performed during access and a list 
of updated changes. After accessing records, SHA-2 hashing algorithm was implemented 
to create hash of every defined operation. This helps to determine the integrity of the 
EHR to verify that the original contents have not been changed and if it has then a log is 
created. 
2.3.2 Interpreting phase 
The interpreting phase is where the hash translator represents every hashed operation 
performed on the EHR and is generated on the patients’ accessed records. It contains all 
defined operations that can be performed and hash formats. Operations hashed in this 
study were limited to read and write. This is because they are the most commonly used 
avenue used by malicious insiders. Other loops such as date of last access of record were 
also embedded in the system. When records are accessed, the interpreter uses its standard 
hash format that contains all possible operations that can be performed on records to 
compare previously hashed values with new values and updates the EHR. All changes are 
then saved on the national healthcare server. 
2.4 The overall bio-cryptography key management system 
The complete EHR system architecture that combines privacy, security and 
accountability is shown in Figure 2. The components of the architecture are described as 
follows: 
2.4.1 Patient and physician 
The focus of the work is mainly to prevent inside attacks, physicians are the primary 
insiders here, as they are the professionals concerned with the diagnosis and treatment of 
diseases, injury, physical and mental impairments and maintaining of patient’s health.  
The patients in this system represent any recipient of healthcare services. 
2.4.2 Images, image analysis, and key 
Each unique cryptographic key is generated from any random image supplied by the 
users. Popular image formats such as the joint photographic experts group (JPEG), 
bitmap images (BMP) and portable network graphics (PNG) are supported. Images can as 
well be deleted after use. The image analysis function uses the GLCM to extract 
statistical texture feature of user specified images. A suitable key for symmetric 
encryption is generated and the image can then be discarded once used. Users will not 
have to create lengthy keys from a random number generator or hard type a strong key 
because the production of keys from images makes it very difficult for inside attackers to 
know which image was used or how the keys were generated. 
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Figure 2 Developed bio-cryptography key management architecture (see online version  
for colours) 
 
2.4.3 Iris scanner and fingerprint scanner 
This study makes use of two different biometrics data capturing devices, a dual iris 
imaging device that captures high quality biometric images of the two irises 
simultaneously was used. Also, a fingerprint device with high minutiae image quality was 
used to capture the fingerprint biometrics data. More importantly, these devices have 
capabilities which are essential in very large scale deployments. 
2.4.4 Temporary database and fuzzy vault 
Once both the keys to be protected and biometrics data are available, they are combined 
to form the helper data for the bio-cryptography scheme. The originally combined 
templates are temporarily stored in temporary database. The fuzzy vault database stores 
the fuzzy helper data for fingerprint and commitment helper data for iris. As soon as the 
commitments or vaults are created, the templates are discarded. This also makes it hard to 
replay templates or Trojan to the system as the original biometrics was not stored. 
2.4.5 EHR database 
This database contains the text based records of patients. The portion of the EHR 
available to any request at any point in time depends on the privacy settings or rule 
presented by the system. 
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2.4.6 Accountability database 
Authorised physicians can perform basically reading and writing to a patient EHR. When 
any of these defined operations are performed, the details of the task performed are 
documented by the system in hash format. For example, if a physician maliciously risked 
a patient’s privacy by gaining malicious access to the confidential record without his or 
her consent, a trace is created in the accountability database. This ensures that patients are 
protected by the system. 
2.4.7 National healthcare server 
The national healthcare server in the framework of the developed system provides the 
only interface to the accountability phase of the system. This is to ensure that patients 
with necessary permission can request detail information about suspected breach to their 
EHR. The accountability system does not reside within a local hospital and the contents 
are protected using a secure hash algorithm. 
2.5 Unified modelling language (UML) analysis of the system 
The structure of the bio-cryptography key management model was identified using the 
unified modelling language (UML) analysis model. The model analysis led to the 
derivation of scenario based elements of the modelling elements, which are: the Use Case 
diagram and activity diagram of the system. The scenario is just a brief user story 
explaining who is using the system and what they are trying to accomplish. The UML 
Use Case diagram, flowchart and activity diagrams are all used to represent the  
bio-cryptography key management system structure. 
Figure 3 shows the developed system use case analysis with the various actors, 
association, includes, extends and use cases associated with them depicted. This is a 
behaviour diagram that visually describes the functional requirements of the  
bio-cryptography key management model in EHR system and the relationships between 
actors and use cases. The three main actors are the patient, physician and the patient 
based escrow system for patient key management. There are four basic Includes-Use-
Cases and four Extends-Use-Cases in the UML Use Case model. Figure 4 shows the 
overall business level activity diagram. This present the operation of the system starting 
from a patient swimlane where the cryptographic key to protect confidential records is 
generated to physician swimlane where refined EHR are accessed using the proposed 
privacy and security scheme. Figure 5 showed the flowchart of the bio-cryptography key 
management model in EHR system. 
2.6 Database model of the system 
Relational modelling technology was adopted for the design of the EHR system database. 
Microsoft SQL Server 2008 database engine was used to develop the database. The EHR 
relational model represents a description of some relvars and their attributes. In this 
design there are 20 relvars: tbleEHR, tblCBiodataC, tblRecType, tblPatientCStatusesCD, 
tblPatientLogin, tblPatientCSurgicalCD, tblPatientCBiodataCD, tblOperation, 
tblPatientCMedicalCD, tblHash, tblFV, tblEnscrowAgency, tblCStatusesC, tblBiocrypt, 
tblPatientCPsychiatricCD, tblPatientCPsychiatricCD, tblDoctorLogin, tblCSurgicalC, 
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tblPsychiatricC, and tblCMedicalC. Each of the relvars is immediately followed by its 
tuples grouped into relations. The bold, underlined attributes are candidate keys. The 
non-bold, underlined attributes are foreign keys. The model relvars and their attributes 
are listed as follows: 
i tbleEHR (eEHRID, PatientNo, BiodataC, CMedicalC, PsychiatricMC, 
CSurgicalC, StatusesC) 
ii tblCBiodataC (BiodataID, Biodata, Basic, Confidential, Emergency) 
iii tblRecType (RecID, RecTypeNo,RecType) 
iv tblPatientCStatusesCD (StatusesID, PatientNo, [HIV/AIDS], [Blood group], 
Genotype, [Hepatitis B], [Hepatitis C] ) 
v tblPatientLogin (LoginID, PatientNo, Password) 
vi tblPatientCSurgicalCD (SurgeryID, PatientNo, [Minor past sugeries], [Surgical 
implants], [Benigh Prostatic Hyperlasia] ) 
vii tblPatientCBiodataCD (PatientID, PatientNo, LicenseNo, HospitalID, Firstname, 
Lastname, DOB, Gender, Religion, Nationality, MaritalStatus, Parity, Sexuality, 
PatientPic, Basic, Confidential, Emergency, Biometrics) 
viii tblOperation (OperationID, OperationNo, LicenseNo, Date, PatientNo, 
RecTypeNo) 
ix tblPatientCMedicalCD (MedicalConditionID, PatientNo, Hypertension, Diabetes, 
[Dyslipidemia/Hypercholesterolemia], Arthritis, Arrhythmia, [Chronic kidney 
disease], Cancer, [Recurrent urinary tract infection], [Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD)], [Medical implant], Asthma, [Congestive heart 
failure], [Myocardial infarction angina], [Coronary artery disease], [Inflammatory 
bowel disease], [Parkinson disease], Epilepsy) 
x tblHash (HashID, OperationNo, Operation, OperationHash, LicenseNo) 
xi tblFV (FVID, LicenseNo, PatientNo, TempHex, FV, Status) 
xii tblEnscrowAgency (EscrowID, PatientNo, PatientKey, LicenseNo, CreatedNow, 
CreatedExpired, HospitalID, KeyStatus, EnrolledYet) 
xiii tblCStatusesC (StatusesID, Statuses, Basic, Confidential, Emergency) 
xiv tblBiocrypt (BiocryptID, HexaBio, BioKey, PatientNo, LicenseNo) 
xv tblPatientCPsychiatricCD (PsychiatricID, PatientNo, Autism, Mania, [Depressive 
illness], Schizophrenia) 
xvi tblDoctorBio (DoctorID, LicenseNo, HospitalID, Firstname, Lastname, Gender, 
DoctorPic, DOB, DoctorBiometrics) 
xvii tblDoctorLogin (LoginID, LicenseNo, Password) 
xviii tblCSurgicalC (CSurgicalCID, CSurgicalC, Basic, Confidential, Emergency) 
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xix tblPsychiatricC (PsychiatricMCID, PsychiatricMC, Basic, Confidential, 
Emergency) 
xx tblCMedicalC (CMedicalCID, CMedicalC, Basic, Confidential, Emergency). 
Figure 3 Use case model of the developed bio-cryptography key management system 
 
3 Findings and discussion 
Privacy of patients was preserved by enforcing sharing rule in the EHR implementation 
so as to limit the number of shared or exposed data about the patients. Patients’ right to 
decide who access their health data means the protection of their privacy. Such access 
will be made available for a particular period of time or session and could be revoked by 
the patients at their own discretion. The EHR view for basic records is shown in Figure 6; 
this section of the EHR does not require any special access besides the physician login. 
The emergency view is shown in Figure 7, this requires a patient biometrics for the 
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records to be decrypted and displayed. Figure 8 shows the confidential records section of 
the designed her, which requires a decryption key from the data owner to be deciphered. 
Figure 4 Business level activity diagram of the developed bio-cryptography system 
 
Four standard key states were implemented: key generation (via GLCM keys), key 
activation (via enrolled and active), key expiration (via enrolled/unenrolled and expired) 
and key archival (via expired). Whenever keys are acknowledged by the recipients,  
they are updated as ‘ENROLLED’. A key can as well expire if it remained 
‘UNENROLLED’ for the duration specified. A key remains ‘ACTIVE’ whether enrolled 
or not as long as the set duration by the patient has not lapsed. 
When a receiving physician for a key is selected, the system enforces that the 
physician can only receive one active key per patients. In contrast, more than one 
physician can have separate active keys per patient as defined by the time specified. Each 
key generated via the modified GLCM method by the patient are stored in an escrowing 
agent database, the escrow agent act as an interface between a patient and his or her 
hospital. The unique timing feature is embedded into the proposed GLCM key generation 
algorithm in order to guarantee patients’ privacy. This implies that, the patient can decide 
for themselves, the lifespan of their GLCM keys. However, the privacy of the receiving 
physicians is also protected as their licenseno are not available in decrypted form in the 
escrow system. 
Figure 9 shows some of the sample keys with other attributes as stored in patients 
owned third party repository for keys. These keys cannot be used by this repository as it 
only identifies its clients who are the patients and ensures that patient’s keys are updated 
or withdrawn at the patient’s wishes. The use of escrow agents was enforced to solve the 
issue of discretional access control and poor delegation of confidential record keys. Also, 
patients do not have to install a personal key management system to keep records of their 
keys. For the purpose of demonstration, the keys stored in the escrow database are not 
encrypted. 
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Figure 5 Flowchart of the developed bio-cryptography system (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 6 Physician view of basic EHR (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 7 Physician view of emergency EHR (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 8 Patient view of confidential EHR (see online version for colours) 
 
3.1 Implementation results of the modified fuzzy vault algorithm for key 
management 
When a physician logs into the system, only basic EHR data as defined by the EHR rules 
embedded into the system are available. Other records categorised as confidential and 
emergency requires special access to decrypt. While confidential records require an 
active and enrolled key from the patient, emergency records require a biometrics of the 
patient to decrypt. If a patient has sent a key, such a key becomes available for enrolment 
so that it can be used by the doctor in the future to access confidential EHR as long as the 
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key is active. An example of a basic record derived from the EHR rule is shown in  
Figure 6. 
Figure 9 Patient’s key information with escrow system (see online version for colours) 
 
Physicians’ biometrics is required to enrol a key and fuzzy vault helper data are 
consequently created. Although, the nature of fingerprint biometrics high false 
acceptance (FAR) could pose a big challenge when matching a vault, in order to avoid 
this, maliciously engineered enrolment is prevented. This EHR system design ensures 
that a doctor cannot use another person’s biometrics to create a vault or enrol a key. This 
implies that a malicious insider who gained access to a doctor’s system login detail would 
not be able to access patients’ confidential keys with his or her biometrics. Figure 10 
presents a malicious insider who has gained access to the login ID and password of a 
doctor but who is unable to enrol or use a key in order to fraudulently gained access to 
the genuine doctor’s and patient’s confidential records. If the right biometrics was 
provided, biometric key enrolment becomes successful and available for use as shown in  
Figure 11. 
A successful match creates a fuzzy vault whose public helper data is a combination of 
the encrypted biometrics, polynomial coefficients and some random numbers. Segment of 
helper data is shown in Figure 12, which represents a section of the fuzzy vault database 
generated by the developed system algorithm. This model allows a single user to have 
multiple vault status, just as an encryption key could expire, a fuzzy vault helper data 
representing a particular key could also be invalid over time. The status of a fuzzy vault 
key is determined by the time set by the patient. Whenever physicians successfully 
enrolled keys with their biometrics, corresponding public fuzzy vault (FV) helper data are 
created. The helper is public in the sense that both the biometrics and the key it encodes 
remained open or visible in the database as helper data. 
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Figure 10 Malicious insider who has gained access to the login ID and password of a doctor  
(see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 11 Successful bio-cryptography key enrolments (see online version for colours) 
 
3.2 Secure hash monitoring 
This work is limited to observe read and write operations. All malicious operations 
performed on patients’ EHR are securely monitored using SHA-256 of the operation 
performed. Since SHA-256 hash is difficult to reverse engineered, it becomes impossible  
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for malicious inside attackers to undo their operations. The ID of the suspect as well as 
the patient whose records are tampered with, were both stored as hash. This reduces the 
volume of logs created unlike in previous similar works, where logs are usually 
voluminous and requiring massive storage requirements. This work tags each hash 
operations together by using similar set of numbers {1,2,3} for operation and record type 
scrambling, this is to make interpretation difficult for anyone who maliciously gained 
access to the accountability database. Figure 13 shows the primary accountability. Log 
volumes are also lesser because operations are identified via tagging. The protection of 
issuer’s privacy is also an improvement over the work of Mashima and Ahamad (2012) 
and accountability is also not limited to emergency which also represents another 
improvement over Sun et al. (2011). 
Figure 12 Segment of fuzzy vault helper data (see online version for colours) 
 
An example of a write operation is shown in Figure 14 and emergency access is shown in 
Figure 15, requiring patient biometrics. A write operation occurs when during  
e-consultation or physical consultation when a physician added new results of diagnosis 
to a patient record. Besides monitoring, every single diagnosis added to a patient EHR 
bears the signature of the updater. Also, a timestamp, which is clearly readable, is also 
added to the new modification made to the records. 
The system design highly disfavours identifying a patient with a wrong biometrics 
during emergency. This is because having access to not just timely information is 
important when dealing with lives of individuals, accurate information is as well 
important so that patients can be diagnosed correctly during emergency. The effect of 
correct identification involves trading a high FAR for moderate false rejection. The FRR 
is moderated by ensuring that more that 80% of an enrolment minute were used for 
verification. The implication of this approach was recorded in the system performance 
evaluation. 
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Figure 13 Primary accountability database (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 14 A write operation into an EHR (see online version for colours) 
 
3.3 System evaluation 
Live biometrics samples of consisting of 200 fingerprints and 200 irises were captured 
and used to test the efficiency of the fuzzy vault and fuzzy vault algorithms. Evaluation 
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metrics: FAR, FRR and time complexity of the algorithms execution were recorded 
accordingly. 
Figure 15 Biometrics accessing of emergency data (see online version for colours) 
 
For most biometric systems, FRR ranges from 0.1% to 20%, meaning that a legitimate 
user will be rejected from one out of 1000 times to one out of 5 times on average. FAR 
ranges from one in 100, for ‘low security applications’, to one in 10,000,000, for ‘very 
high security’ applications. The FAR of the fingerprint fuzzy vault is 0% while the FRR 
is 2%. The system FAR of 0% which is extremely low for fingerprint identification and 
this implies keys will not likely be available to malicious users by trial and error or brute 
force approach. 
Most of the work in literature emphasises accuracy and not on the time cost of 
encrypting and decrypting a vault especially when using the slow error correcting codes 
to decipher a vault or commitment. The total encryption time for the fuzzy vault was 
24.914 s with average of 0.125 ms per vault. The total decryption time was 459.284 s 
with an average vault decryption time of 2.296 s per helper data. Figure 16 shows the 
execution time of the fingerprint fuzzy vault algorithm with the four rejected biometrics. 
A segment of the experimentation data are illustrated in Figure 17, where 1 indicates a 
correct acceptance while 0 represent a false rejection. 
There were higher discrepancies between iris code encoding and decoding time. 
Hamming distance threshold of 0.3 is used in order to identify iris codes that are 
sufficiently close. The iris fuzzy commitment has a total encoding time of 7.789 s  
and an average encoding time of 0.0389 ms which represent a better performance 
compare to the fingerprint fuzzy vault values (total: 24.914 s and average: 0.125 ms). 
However, the total decoding time is 610 s with average decoding time of 3.051 s; these 
values were higher than the ones obtained from fuzzy vault evaluation (total: 459.284 s 
total and average: 2.296 s). Even though, iris fuzzy commitment appeared to be faster  
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when encoding the 200 iris codes, overhead of 150.716 s for just 200 irises could become 
a challenge when the iris code dataset becomes larger. This unanticipated higher 
decoding time contributed to one of the reasons fuzzy vault is preferred in the developed 
bio-cryptography key management in EHR. 
Figure 16 Fuzzy vault execution, acceptance and rejection graph (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 17 A segment of the fuzzy vault evaluation database (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 18 shows the total encoding and decoding time for the commitment together with 
the acceptance and rejection rate. Similar to fuzzy vault, a FAR of zero is recorded. The 
fuzzy commitment FRR is 10% which is higher than the best known iris fuzzy 
commitment by Hao et al. (2006) where similar commitment scheme was used with 
Daugman algorithm for iris codes. The result is however better than FRR of 50.0% and a  
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FAR of 7.0% for iris biometrics obtained later by Maiorana and Ercole (2007) among 
others as displayed in Table 2. One major challenge is due to the difficultly in 
constructing high quality iris codes of shorter bit streams. 
Figure 18 Fuzzy commitment execution, acceptance and rejection graph (see online version  
for colours) 
 
The BuIris contains 640 × 480 pixel iris image dimension and in .bmp format.  
All the templates used in this work were converted to conform with the standard  
ISO 19794-2:2005 for fingerprints and ISO/IEC 19794-6:2005 for iris data. These 
formats are generic in that they may be applied and used in a wide range of application 
areas where automated fingerprints minutiae and iris code are to be captured. 
4 Implications and limitations 
Technologies have metamorphosed the role of patients from the conventional passive 
receiver of healthcare services into a more active role in which they have more 
understanding of their medical records and are empowered with the ability to make 
certain choices and be involved in decisions making. This study has provided a support 
for active patients’ participation in maintaining privacy and security in EHR systems that 
relied solely on cryptography for achieving them (Benaloh et al., 2009; Sun et al., 2011;  
Li et al., 2012; Dharanya et al., 2013). The sophistication of these systems depends  
on the secrecy of encryption keys and this is one of the issues addressed in this study.  
The proposed scheme in this work can increase patients’ trust of cryptographic- 
based-EHR. 
Encryption keys methods used in this study will enable patients to generate keys that 
can be used by anyone they want to give confidential access for specified durations. This 
satisfies the purpose of patients’ privacy to exercise control on the limit to which access 
to their confidential information is available. 
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Table 2 Experimental results of fuzzy vault and fuzzy commitment 
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The essence of the predefined confidential attributes of EHR saves individual practitioner 
from the stress of having to repeatedly decide what a patient can protect at any point in 
time. In the design of the EHR, some of the attributes selected by the practitioners were 
overlapped, this redundancy ensures that some attributes of EHR appears in more than 
one sections (basic, confidential and emergency) covered in this study. The benefit of this 
to practitioners is that, every record that needs to be available for patients’ general 
treatments are available. For example, attributes like genotype is always in any record 
while HIV status is only available in confidential and emergency. 
This study presents one of the few deployments and empirical analysis of the 
complex fuzzy vault and fuzzy commitment schemes in an application. Evaluation results 
are very positive in terms of the access time and accuracy especially for the fingerprints 
fuzzy vault. This means that in a time and precision dependent application like the EHR,  
bio-cryptography can be used to secure keys and patients privacy without much 
performance degradation. In addition, other researchers can deploy similar or improved 
methods in several other real life applications based on the results obtained in this study. 
The evaluation of the time-dependent GLCM key algorithm is not carried out in even 
though, keys were generated from small region of the image to lower the computational 
overhead of processing a full image. It is important that future work considers the 
experimentation of the time cost that it will take patients to generate their confidential 
keys. 
5 Conclusion 
Privacy and security are two important factors that must be considered when developing 
a patient centric EHR. Existing works have focused largely on security and less on how 
patient mastermind privacy control with the help of the healthcare providers. Also, 
outside threats were of more concern, but more often than expected insiders who have 
legitimate access to EHR are often overlooked. This research implements cryptographic 
techniques with biometrics despite its key security challenges. This research contributed 
to the body of knowledge in healthcare and self-care through the development of a  
bio-cryptography key management scheme for ensuring the privacy of patients attributes 
in a cryptographic oriented EHR. The result of the system evaluation shows significant 
improvements as the biometrics FAR were greatly reduced which lessens the likelihood 
of imposters gaining successful access to patients protected health information. This 
result also justifies the feasibility of implementing fuzzy key binding scheme in real 
applications, especially fuzzy vault, which demonstrated a high performance from 
evaluation. 
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